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Everything posted by The_King

  1. Tiger Balm bears the kind of scent that’s impossible to forget. It lingers in the nose, demands your attention, stirs emotions ranging from undulated bliss to faint disgust; it even invites unsolicited comments. “You smell like an old man!” bellows a tactless friend, on the one day I decide to slather on Tiger Balm Neck & Shoulder Rub (non-greasy). Gee, thanks? Immediately I regret having suggested the meet-up. Barely a minute in, and already I’ve been affronted. Yet here Tiger Balm stands, a centenarian brand that’s one of the beacons behind the Haw Par Group’s S$200 million net worth. How exactly did a humble, all-herbal ointment develop so loyal a following—one that just keeps growing? Mr A K Han easily supplies the answers to Tiger Balm’s longevity: the product works. “It delivers on its promise: it works where it hurts,” he states plainly. “We’re pain- relieving experts. People trust Tiger Balm.” It’s so simple an answer, I almost want to challenge it. In his 27 years at Haw Par Group, the Executive Director has successfully reshaped Tiger Balm into a global brand whose line of 18 products is stocked across over 70 countries. The man knows the product better than you or I ever will, having practically revived it in the ’90s from what might well have been the ointment’s sunset days. Since Mr Han joined the company in 1991, sales have only increased. In 2018, almost 60 million units of Tiger Balm’s distinct, hexagonal jars of red and white ointment were sold globally. In the lead-up to meeting him, curiosity led me to run a casual poll in my Instagram stories. Now, I’m no influenza (cough), but the results from my paltry number of followers seemed to run parallel to my opinions about the homegrown brand. It revealed that my friends—mostly in their 20s to early 30s—think Tiger Balm smells great (74%) despite being dated (55%), and works exactly as it claims to (56%). When I share these findings with Mr Han, he seems pleased, if unsurprised: “The pains of yesteryear and the pains of today are the same. The difference is the causes of these pains. Your grandfather’s pains may have been [the result of] manual labour, and yours from using your mobile phone or computer. But these pains have remained unchanged, and as long as the product works, people will believe in you.” It’s clear he’s thought this through. In fact, he repeats the brand’s tagline—works where it hurts—several times throughout our conversation. The medicated ointment isn’t without its competitors; Axe Brand Oil and Vicks VapoRub carry equally weighted histories, and are backed by their share of loyal customers. Yet Mr Han appears unfazed, a mark of his genuine confidence in the product he’s in charge of marketing globally. The recipe for the ointment has remained largely unchanged for over a century. A mixture of camphor, cajuput oil, menthol, and dementholised mint oil are bound by a base of paraffin wax and petrolatum, then left to set in Tiger Balm’s iconic jars. At the final step, a custom-made machine wraps each jar in hexagonal paper packaging before sending it off to be hand-packed in larger boxes for shipping. From day-to-day, Tiger Balm’s Singapore factory is helmed by some 100 workers, supplemented by yet more in its Malaysia and China-based factories. The ointment-making process is a rather fascinating one to observe, even if simply through pictures; unfortunately, multiple requests for a factory tour came to nought, owing to the factory floors not being equipped with touring corridors for visitors. But what’s most fascinating is how far back the earliest formula was concocted: in the 1800s, by a Hakka herbalist named Aw Chu Kin. Shortly after developing the recipe in the Fujian province of China, he set sail for Rangoon (present-day Yangon). In 1870, Chu Kin established his first sinseh shop: Eng Aun Tong, the Hall of Everlasting Peace. Following his death, the recipe was passed on to two of his sons—Boon Haw and Boon Par. The Aw brothers honed the formula in their humble Rangoon home, thus birthing the earliest form of Tiger Balm: Ban Kim Ewe, or Ten Thousand Golden Oil. To customers, Ban Kim Ewe was a panacea; a cure-all for body aches and all manner of ailments, whether a cold or migraine. Later, the ointment was renamed Tiger Balm—after Boon Haw’s nickname, gentle tiger—and found great success, thanks to Boon Haw’s foresight and charisma. In 1926, he upped and moved to Singapore, leaving Boon Par to manage Tiger Balm’s business in Rangoon. You’d likely know of the fabled Haw Par Villa and its ties to the Aw brothers, but what you probably didn’t know is the amusement park had been known as Tiger Balm Gardens at the point of its construction in 1937—and was gifted by Boon Haw to Boon Par. Like a crowning jewel, located on the park’s peak was Boon Par’s domed villa, a picture of opulence in its time. To get around the vast park’s meandering paths, Boon Haw fashioned a super extra (sorry) cat mobile that doubled as a roving, attention-catching centrepiece; one that effectively spread word of Tiger Balm. Prior to that, though, a far more important landmark had been established with Tiger Balm’s move into Singapore: the Tiger Balm Medical Hall (Eng Aung Tong), named in honour of their late father’s sinseh shop. The factory quickly became the base from which the well-loved ointment would further flourish. For all the success that Tiger Balm earned as a panacea in its early years, its one- size-fits-all approach was not to last—particularly with a turning point in the 1970s. Exactly where Mr Han fits into the Haw Par Group’s storied heritage, though, is an intriguing one that begs retelling. “It would take me days to explain to you how we got this far,” he laughs. “It took me 27 years.” Considering the brand’s past, it’s no exaggeration when he says this far. This far starts in March 1991, when Mr Han was headhunted from a well-paid position at Cerebos—where he’d been handling Brand’s Essence of Chicken—to market Tiger Balm products globally. “When I joined [as General Manager], Tiger Balm’s reputation was entrusted to me. Having marketed big brands like Brand’s, Panadol and Vicks VapoRub [at Cerebos], there was an expectation for me to rebuild Tiger Balm into a big business. That was daunting. Failure wasn’t an option.” At the point of Mr Han’s entry into Haw Par Group, the company was in shambles, having emerged less than two decades earlier from the scandal-shorn Slater Walker saga*. The Haw Par Group had also been in the midst of regaining control of Tiger Balm, after having licensed the product out for 20 years. By then, the ointment had lost an entire generation of consumers. *TLDR (oh, the irony); the Slater Walker group gained control of the Haw Par Group from 1971 to 1974. Later, it was discovered that millions of dollars in undisclosed earnings had been siphoned into off-shore funds by the investment giant’s directors. But exactly what caused the tumble goes several years back to Boon Haw’s nephew—Aw Cheng Chye—who assumed control of the family business following his uncle’s death in 1954. Fuelled by grand plans to expand the Haw Par empire, Cheng Chye made some sweeping changes. In July 1969, Haw Par Brothers (Private) Limited was renamed Haw Par International Limited, or Haw Par Group. With it, much of the late Aw brothers’ assets were transferred and listed on the now-defunct Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore. The Haw Par Group was also subsumed under Slater Walker Securities Limited—yep, that investment group whose board of directors would later find themselves under investigation. Apart from various stakes in investments and properties, Cheng Chye also negotiated a joint venture that would inevitably lead to Tiger Balm’s downfall. For the next 20 years, the ointment was to be licensed out to Jack Chia Industries and Australia Drug Houses for manufacturing. As the venture drew to a close in 1991, the Haw Par Group launched an injunction against the Jack Chia Group—for producing, of all things, a direct imitator to Tiger Balm. Golden Lion Shield Balm bore a hexagonal jar, an identical gold-coloured lid, and was openly marketed and distributed alongside Tiger Balm. Correspondingly, the group had also adjusted the price of Tiger Balm twice in two years while selling its imitation ointment at a lower price point. In the two decades under the Jack Chia Group’s tenure, Tiger Balm’s branding suffered severely. “It was essentially like starting afresh, except with baggage,” Mr Han laughs dryly, on reclaiming Tiger Balm in 1992. “20 years is a long time. Nothing much had been done about our brand, and once the licensee knew we’d be taking Tiger Balm back, they stopped supporting our ointment.” Armed with the task of growing the brand’s global presence, the Haw Par management launched a S$10 million advertising campaign covering key markets including Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand, Germany, and the USA—an amount factoring in the high costs to entry per market, which Mr Han puts at around US$1 million. Planting so large a sum clearly came at a risk; Tiger Balm was, as he aptly describes, “A Singapore-made product and company—a small player against the big boys,” which included Japan’s Salonpas and Germany’s Beiersdorf. “To enter such markets, you first needed trade acceptance. With no one willing to sell for us, there was naturally no demand. And with no demand, nobody was willing to sell [Tiger Balm] for us,” he points out. “But we were patient in letting it grow.” This vicious cycle was broken thanks to the management’s stoic belief in the product and, clearly, Mr Han’s abilities, though he doesn’t say it outright. To recapture the lost generation of Tiger Balm users (no thanks to the Jack Chia venture), Mr Han led the brand in launching medicinal plasters for muscle aches and pains in 1993, modified and built off the ointment’s versatile base. “Today’s younger generation doesn’t believe in cure-all products. They want specific products for specific ailments. To them, Tiger Balm is a grandfather’s product,” he adds—to which I can’t help but nod fervently, despite myself. The present range of Tiger Balm products spans everything from mosquito repellent patches and spray—“an overnight bestseller”, in Mr Han’s words—to muscle gels and a non-greasy neck-and-shoulder rub, which (strictly speaking) has worked wonders on my perpetual shoulder pains. The brand also cleverly capitalised on its use as a pre-exercise rub by sponsoring sporting events and supporting Team Tiger Balm, its community of sports ambassadors. At present, these include reigning Olympic triple jump athlete Christian Taylor, and professional rock-climber Sasha Digiulian. Even celebrities have jumped on the bandwagon, unendorsed; Bruno Mars and Lady Gaga, to name two. “Branding is everything,” Mr Han explains. “We have to make sure our brand image is consistent throughout the world. Much like McDonald’s—you go to any country, [and] it tastes and feels the same. If I buy Tiger Balm off the shelf in Norway, it’d better be of the same quality as in Singapore.” Little yet so much has changed in the space between the past and now. While Haw Par Group’s key sources of revenue remain in healthcare, investments, and property—backed by its 595-strong team of employees—the Tiger Balm story has largely evolved, yet not at all. Its Singapore team maintains full control over global advertising collaterals, a necessary step in ensuring the true essence of Tiger Balm is retained. And what is the true essence of Tiger Balm? In metaphorical terms, and as Mr Han puts it, “Ferocity. Energy. The word ‘tiger’ is easily remembered, understood, feared and loved among all cultures. To have the name ‘Tiger Balm’ is very unique to us, and something we’re very fortunate to have.” https://sg.style.yahoo.com/tiger-balm-works-where-hurts-161026946.html
  2. SINGAPORE - An 18-month-old toddler died in hospital on Friday (Aug 23) after a standing mirror fell on her inside fashion store Urban Revivo at Jewel Changi Airport. A spokesman for Jewel Changi Airport said that the accident had occurred because a full-length mirror in the store had fallen and injured the child. Staff on-site administered first aid to the child while waiting for the paramedics to arrive. "We are working closely with the tenant to ascertain the details of the incident," said the spokesman. "Out of respect for the privacy of the family, we are unable to comment further." The Singapore Civil Defence Force said they responded to a medical incident at 78 Airport Boulevard at 12.33pm on Friday. Police said the child was unconscious when she was taken to Changi General Hospital, where she was subsequently pronounced dead. Police are investigating the unnatural death. Urban Revivo told The Straits Times it was "deeply saddened by the tragic accident" and that it was assisting the police with its investigations. Both the store and Jewel Changi Airport said they were in contact with the family of the child and supporting them through the difficult time. According to Chinese-language newspaper Lianhe Wanbao, the child's family, believed to be tourists from China, collected her body from the morgue on Saturday morning, accompanied by Jewel staff. Pictures taken after the accident show the store was cordoned off and a sign was Shin Min Daily News reported that witnesses at the mall saw staff from the store asking nearby shops for ice to apply first aid for the toddler after the accident. According to its website, Urban Revivo is a Chinese fashion clothing store founded in 2006, with 200 stores in China and across the world, including Europe, North America and Japan. The store has three outlets in Singapore, including Jewel Changi Airport, Plaza Singapura and Raffles City. Several incidents have been reported at Jewel Changi Airport since it opened its doors in April, although most of them involved only minor injuries. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/toddler-dies-after-mirror-falls-on-her-in-fashion-store-at-jewel-changi
  3. yes a bit. cold one stronger taste, hot one the taste is weak
  4. too mcuh work just cook then wash until water is clear then add sauce to eat
  5. the soba 800gram for 3.90 and the sauce 280ml for $7.90
  6. other country cannot match china in assembled etc..... but trump is giving other country to improve and not to depend on one country too much. if that happen, no one will care about china, cause anyone also can make
  7. i laugh when those ppl at cna FB say usa going down cause no one buy american goods in china. if only they read the number, how many china ppl really buy iphone, nike, amerians hardware tools, electronic etc..... trump just to Tariff even more to speed up
  8. they just Tariff themself to death Who buy american car in china. and who buy US goods in china and i think they forgot about america shale oil
  9. China’s numerous small banks are still struggling to raise the finances needed to be able to offer more loans to aid the slowing economy nearly three months after the country’s first bank failure in more than 20 years. After the government takeover of Baoshang Bank at the end of May, larger banks and investors remain cautious about providing financing to smaller institutions, fearful that their balances sheets hide large numbers of bad loans amid a continued government clampdown on risky lending. The slowing of the Chinese economy is putting increasing pressure on the loan portfolios of small banks, many of whose customers are the smaller, private sector business that are being hit hard by the effects of the trade war with the United States. The government is continuing to try to boost lending to help stabilise economic growth, but the credit crunch for small lenders has held back progress. Net new national aggregate financing – a broad measure of credit and liquidity in the world’s second largest economy – slumped to 1.01 trillion yuan (US$144 billion) in July, less than half the 2.26 trillion yuan gain in June and much weaker than the expected 1.63 trillion yuan, according to the data released by the People’s Bank of China on Monday. Much of the slowdown was due to inability of small and medium-sized banks to raise money in the interbank market, where banks lend to and borrow from each other. This was underscored by the drop in short term securities, known as bankers’ acceptances, which decreased by 456.3 billion yuan (US$65 billion) last month, expanding on the loss of 131.2 billion yuan in June, the Chinese central bank data showed. “That showed a rapid contraction of interbank business,” said New Times Securities chief economist Pan Xiangdong. Liang Hong, chief economist at China International Capital Corporation, said that the government’s move to rein in the growth of interbank assets and unregulated shadow-banking activities was the main cause of the worse-than-expected slowdown in credit growth. She also predicted that the deleveraging of small and medium-sized banks would continue to weigh on the overall credit expansion for the rest of the year. Small Chinese banks, especially the group of local lenders known as city commercial banks, have found it difficult to obtain financing in the market since the government takeover of the Baoshang Bank in May, which was the first bank failure in China since 1998. For the first time, Chinese regulators chose not to guarantee all of the deposits and investments of corporate and large interbank customers, which immediately reduced the willingness of large banks and institutional investors to lend to hundreds of smaller local banks. Nearly three months later, small banks were still suffering from the crisis of confidence that Baoshang’s failure created, said Zhang Ping, deputy director general of the National Institution for Finance and Development. “The [interbank] market now faces a grim situation,” said Zhang. “If [small banks] are unable to borrow a penny and can’t issue new bonds, the market will close up.” The interest rate that regional banks have to pay to borrow money – the so-called risk premium – is now seen as so high that many smaller banks cannot afford it. The shortage of funding, in turn, has eroded their ability to extend new loans to their corporate customers. These small banks account for more than half the lending to small and micro-sized private-sector firms, who in turn account for much of the economy’s growth and employment. The funding struggles of small banks are reflected in the July lending data, which showed total new corporate loans plunged by two-thirds to 297.4 billion yuan (US$42.3 billion) in July, from 910.5 billion yuan (US$129.5 billion) in June. Short-term loans declined by 219.5 billion yuan from a year ago, doubling the drop of 103.5 billion yuan recorded in the same month last year. Guosheng Securities analyst Xiong Yuan said that the decline in short-term corporate lending showed banks’ weakening appetite to lend due to the growing list of small lenders that have fallen into trouble. In the latest example highlighting the problems facing small banks, HengFeng Bank, a regional lender based in the city of Yantai in Shandong province, was last month taken over by Central Huijian Investment, a Chinese government-owned investment fund, according to a report by the Shanghai Securities News earlier this month. In April, trading in the shares of the Hong Kong-listed Bank of Jinzhou was suspended before the bank was bailed out with capital injections from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the country’s largest lender by assets, and two of China’s four largest state-controlled distressed debt managers, China Cinda Asset Management and China Great Wall Asset Management, last month. All three banks – Baoshang, Jinzhou and HengFeng – were linked to fugitive financier Xiao Jianhua. The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) said in a statement in early June that Xiao’s Tomorrow Group had sold its holdings in more than 10 financial institutions as part of a state-mandated process of divesting assets to reduce financial risks. The CBIRC also confirmed that the financial institutions in which Tomorrow Group still owned stakes were in a stable condition. “Expect more bailouts, takeovers, and consolidations to come,” analysts at Trivium China said. “Baoshang was the start of a trend for China’s small banks – not a one-off.” The remark was echoed by Zhang from the National Institution for Finance and Development, who said that the credit crunch for small and medium-sized lenders would last into the second half of the year. “The fears of [big] institutions [to lend to regional banks] are still there,” he said, even though, unlike the failure of Baoshang, the full amount of money held by depositors and investors in Jinzhou was guaranteed in the rescue. In the second week of August there some signs of improvement in the interbank market, with city commercial banks able to sell 75 per cent of their funding securities, up from 61 per cent during the previous week and close to the level before the Baoshang failure. However, lower-rated institutions were still having problems, with AA rated banks only able to sell 37 per cent of their securities. “The total volume [of funding securities] looks to be no problem, but the funds are really not flowing to [institutions with] AA or lower ratings,” Zhang said. The credit drought that regional lenders face will not be solved by the government simply pumping more money into the banking system, he added, suggesting more targeted solutions were needed. Added to the woes of small bank, and given cause for the reluctance to lend to them, their non-performing loan (NPL) ratios has been rising since last year. The average NPL ratio of city commercial banks jumped to 2.30 per cent by the end of June from 1.88 at the end of March. In contrast, the ratio of large commercial banks improved to 1.26 per cent at the end of June from 1.32 per cent at the end of the first quarter. And, as of August 6, more than 20 city and rural commercial banks had postponed disclosure of their annual reports for 2018, suggesting significant problems with their balance sheets. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3022948/chinas-small-banks-still-struggling-obtain-funds-lend-three
  10. i try tml, if i try now, later i cannot sleep
  11. i try with stevia. me cannot take sugar
  12. me is to add cream = shock top one nv try before, only bottom one is good
  13. but you went to GILF. sultan plaza dont have milf only gilf muahhahaha
  14. if all failed. there always C4
  15. original post: it been 2yr since i hoot anything from iherb here is my hoot yummy. pork rind eye supplement and fish oil (this fish oil is one of the best ) it have certificate of analysis, certification and certification ratings like: EPAX, Ph.Eur., USP, Prop. 65, GOED, IFOS, API, cGMP, and FOS) it EPAX omega 3 fish oil is widely used in clinical trials & medical studies: https://www.epax.com/science/clinical-trials/) nice smell for my shoe and room for face and eye my earl grey tea for cooking, drink and baking etc.....
  16. it been 2yr since i hoot anything from iherb here is my hoot yummy. pork rind eye supplement and fish oil (this fish oil is one of the best ) it have certificate of analysis, certification and certification ratings like: EPAX, Ph.Eur., USP, Prop. 65, GOED, IFOS, API, cGMP, and FOS) it EPAX omega 3 fish oil is widely used in clinical trials & medical studies: https://www.epax.com/science/clinical-trials/) nice smell for my shoe and room for face and eye my earl grey tea for cooking, drink and baking etc.....
  17. You have my moral support.
  18. Shhhh. All you need to know my aunt stay there
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